Free Will Is An Illusion, But Freedom Isn’t
In quantum physics the so-called probability amplitude
evolves according to deterministic laws but the transformation from many possible outcomes to one actual outcome takes place
purely by chance. The statistical distribution for such chance
events follows strict rules, but the outcome of an individual
chance event is unpredictable and cannot be controlled by will.
Thus any decision is either the predictable result of earlier causes
(which may include quantum chance events) and is not free from
determinism, or is itself a quantum chance event and is not
willed. Either way, the free will we commonly take for granted is
absent. What then is the freedom to choose that we so cherish
and which politicians like to invoke at every opportunity?
Choice Under Determinism
In order to focus on the essential issues, let us put chance
events aside, since, as we have seen, quantum randomness does
not rescue free will. In this simplified context, let’s try to see
whether our subjective feeling of freedom can
be reconciled with physical determinism.
One thing we can’t avoid noticing is that we
have the experience of making choices. In fact,
each choice consists of two stages. In stage one
we conceive alternatives, and in stage two we are
aware that we have picked one of them. Often
the option picked is the one whose consequences
we prefer over the consequences of its
alternatives, but the comparison of consequences
is not always done consciously. Furthermore,
both genetic predispositions and past
experiences play a role in forming an individual’s
preferences, so the causative factors leading to
the making of a choice are complex. The conclusion
is that although we do experience
choice-making – that transition from stage one
to stage two – this doesn’t imply the absence of
determining causative factors. We also have the
impression that we could have chosen differently.
But once a choice has been made, what
sense is there to this idea? That is, although a
decision-maker faced with the same set of alternatives
again may make a different selection the
second time, that would be because the overall
situation, including the state of brain and mind,
has changed. But once again, this choice is the
result of previous causes. Hence the existence of
free will in the sense of an autonomous force at
the very moment of decision unconstrained by
past causes, is not required to explain our actual
experience of choosing. Our experience of
choice-making is perfectly compatible with
determinism if we accept that the transition
from stage one to stage two – that is, from multiple
possible options to the one actually chosen – is, like any other kind of event in the world, the result of previous
causes.
Once choice is properly understood in this way – as being
causally, physically determined – we can proceed to consider
the notion of free choice in wider ways. If a man holds a gun to
my head and demands my wallet, and I choose to obey him
rather than to try and fight, that’s a ‘coerced choice’. In contrast
with this, we can say that a free choice is one that is not
coerced. Ultimately, freedom in this sense depends on the
absence of conflict between the choice-maker’s nature, character,
or core desires and the intended consequences of their
actions. Since we are not averse to admitting that our nature is
the result of our genetic predispositions and our past circumstances,
this notion of freedom can readily coexist with the
hidden operation of physical determinism, and also with the
fuller scientific worldview where physical determinism is supplemented
by quantum randomness.
Compatibilism & Moral Responsibility
Still, how can I be responsible for the consequences of such
free choices, when the chains of events that cause them were
determined outside myself, beginning long ago? The answer is
hinted at in the word ‘responsible’. The president of a nation
may take responsibility for his administration’s bad handling of
relief work after a natural disaster, for example, even though he
was not personally involved in any of the snafus occurring at the
operational level. Analogously, although many aspects of my
being pull me in different directions and argue with one another
during the making of a difficult decision, there is a relatively
stable center that I identify as my self, and this recognition means
that I can take or own the responsibility for each decision that’s
made by me, even through or after the competition of all these
factors. This is an appropriate expediency, since the detailed
tracing of all the responsible factors is practically impossible.
The nature of the self is obviously complex. Some people
have a narrow sense, and some an expansive sense, of the
responsible self, and even the same person’s self-perception may
change over time. Or for example, a drug addict caught in a
crime may claim “My habit made me do it!” In so saying he’s
treating his habit as if it’s not a part of him. However, in pondering
his responsibility, the jury ought to take into consideration whether his habit was formed with his knowledge or without it
(it might sometimes be a result of taking medicine his doctor
prescribed). In other words, the jury should assign responsibility
for the crime not just on the basis of whether the recent criminal
act was itself a completely uncoerced choice, but also on
whether some past free acts of the accused contributed to him
being in a state where he committed the present crime.
Adopting the absence of coercion instead of the absence of
determinism as the essence of freedom gets us out of a conflict
with the prevalent scientific worldview. Nonetheless, this
notion still captures the importance of freedom – as a condition
that enables a person to be true to himself, and also as a
criterion for judging whether it is fair to hold a person responsible
for their actions.
VOCABULARY
- unfold - раскрываться
- consequence - следствие
- granted - продоставляется
- absent - нет на месте
- coerced - принуждают
- circumstances - обстоятельства